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Roberto Gronda*
Nicolas Rescher, Pragmatism. The Restoration of Its Scientific Roots, New Brunswick 
and London: Transaction Publishers, 2012, 313 p.; The Pragmatic Vision. Themes 
in Philosophical Pragmatism, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, 156 p.
In Pragmatism. The Restoration of Its Scientific Roots (P) and The Pragmatic 
Vision. Themes in Philosophical Pragmatism (PV) Rescher continues the work of 
analysis and assessment of the pragmatist tradition that he started more than thirty 
years ago with the publication of his The Primacy of Practice (1973). The thirty 
essays that compose the two books (some of them already published elsewhere) deal 
with a large number of issues, ranging from axiology to epistemology, from art to 
religion. They contribute therefore to expand Rescher’s epistemological pragmatism 
into a richer and more articulated philosophy of “experience”, broad enough and wide 
enough to encompass almost all the aspects of the human life.
Rescher is well known for his major contribution to the renaissance of pragmatism 
in the 1970s and 1980s. In contrast to the post-modernist interpretations of 
pragmatism, he has always been very critical of any attempt aiming at conceiving the 
pragmatist maxim as a proto-deconstructionist theory of truth. In his texts Rescher 
has convincingly shown that pragmatism does not necessarily lead to such an extreme 
position. Certainly, it is possible to read James’ individualistic pragmatism as entailing 
the conclusion that what is useful for me is true, but it is impossible to accommodate 
Peirce’s (and even Dewey’s) understanding of the pragmatic maxim into that scheme 
without betraying the significance that that maxim actually had for him. There is a 
pragmatism of the left and a pragmatism of the right, Rescher remarks. The former, held 
by James and Rorty, views “our scientific knowledge as a mere human contrivance, 
and unfettered invention devised for practical purposes...but without any claims to 
actual or approximate truth”; the latter, which he and Peirce advocate, “rejects such 
negativism and in its place substitutes a fallibilism that takes our scientific knowledge 
to represent the best currently available estimate of the actual truth of things” (P: 11). 
The preference for the Peircean strain of pragmatism is a permanent feature of 
Rescher’s thought. The subtitle The Restoration of Its Scientific Roots shows that he 
has not changed his mind on this point. His is a scientific pragmatism, centered on the 
notions of method, success, and evolution, in which no room is left for the slightest 
doubt on the possibility of achieving a sound knowledge of reality. The key concept 
here is that of praxis: Rescher argues that the pragmatist insistence on the centrality 
of praxis in knowledge leads to a substantial transformation of the epistemological 
landscape. Traditional problems – the nature of induction, the relation between truth 
and evidence, the justification of normativity, the choice between alternative logics, 
etc. – change their shape as a result of the change of the overall theoretical framework. 
Since the language in which epistemological problems are formulated is changed, we 
cannot be any longer satisfied with the answers that have been previously given to 
them.
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In this spirit, Rescher devotes two long essays to formulate his pragmatist 
conception of induction – “A Pragmatic Justification of Induction” (P) and “Induction 
as Pragmatic Resource” (PV). When knowledge is conceived of as a form of praxis, he 
states, induction comes to be seen as “a tool for use by finite intelligences intended to 
secure not the best possible answer...but the best available answer” (PV: 52). Through 
induction a finite human being tries to bridge the gap between the partial data that are 
available to him and the objective knowledge which he aims at. An inquirer has some 
information about the world: for instance, he sees smoke. Then he searches for an 
enthymematic premise – that is, for a possible, plausible premise – which enables him 
to provide meaning to the available information in the easiest and smoothest way. He 
may assume, say, that the case under consideration is to be subsumed under the rule 
“this smoke is being caused by a fire” instead of under the rule “this smoke is being 
released from a storage container”. He can choose whatever rule he prefers, provided 
that the rule he chooses is in accordance with the background information available 
(PV: 55). Therefore, the conclusion he draws – “there is a fire there” instead of “there 
is a smoke-discharging storage container there” – is an estimation suggested from the 
data at hand, which is tenable insofar as it is sensible and defensible.
This does not mean, however, that since it is tenable, the conclusion is true: as 
Rescher writes, “[a]ny step beyond the information securely at hand involves the 
risk of error” (PV: 58). Rescher’s point is precisely that inductive reasoning is not a 
matter of inference, but rather of plausible conjecture (PV: 54). Practical reasoning 
is different from purely logical inference since while the latter descends from the 
premises to the conclusion, the former jumps from a set of data to a conclusion that is 
never guaranteed. The practical turn that Rescher wants to take comes here to the fore, 
and reveals its theoretical significance. Pragmatist epistemology shifts the attention 
from the justification of a particular factual thesis to the validation of a practical 
course of action. “On the methodological perspective”, Rescher remarks, “the pivotal 
issue is not the factual one of establishing an empirical generalization, but rather 
that of legitimating an operational program of action” (P: 138). What is important, 
therefore, is to account for the validity of a practice, that is, for a general course of 
action that has proven to be reliable in the past. Such a justification can be provided 
only by reference to the evolutionary conditions that have regulated, and still regulate, 
the development of our methods of inquiry. When one realizes that our cognitive 
capacities are tools or instruments, the question of evaluation turns into the problem 
of assessing their pragmatic validity. “In the Western intellectual tradition”, Rescher 
concludes, “the ultimate standards of rationality are defined by a very basic concept 
of knowledge-wed-to-practice, and their ultimate validation lies in the combination of 
theoretical and practical success: i.e., success of theory in the effective guidance of 
action” (P: 147).
It is impossible – and it would be probably not very interesting – to discuss in 
detail all the arguments outlined in the numerous essays collected in the two books. 
The essence of Rescher’s reflections on pragmatism is well known among pragmatist 
scholars. Therefore, I think it is more convenient to focus on those that show a higher 
degree of originality with respect to the standard pragmatist views. The reason why 
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I have devoted so much space to the discussion of Rescher’s account of induction is 
precisely because it makes apparent some of the distinctive features of his pragmatism. 
The traits of novelty of Rescher’s pragmatist philosophy can be approached from many 
different points of view; however, my suggestion is that the easiest way to grasp their 
real import is to understand the implications of Rescher’s philosophical commitment 
to Peirce. Rescher explicitly acknowledges his debt to the founder of pragmatism: 
three of the thirty essays which make up the two books are dedicated to locating Peirce 
within the pragmatic movement – “Pragmatism at the Crossroads”, “Pragmatism’s 
Historical Development in Pragmatism”, and “The Pragmatic Vision” (the latter is 
contained in the book of the same name). As has already been noted, Rescher praises 
Peirce for his evidential and methodological interpretation of the pragmatic maxim, 
and sides with him against the excesses of James and Rorty. However, more important 
than the common conclusion which they reach is the common standpoint from which 
they approach the problems of justification, knowledge, meaning, and so on. 
What is crucial for Rescher is Peirce’s realism, in all its different forms – 
metaphysical, epistemological, moral. Rescher articulates this insight through his 
notion of purposeful action. The idea of purposeful action – in terms of which he 
purports to provide an account of all human practices, insofar as they are meaningful 
(see on this point “Pragmatism and Purpose”, the first essay of P) – is intended to 
highlight the realistic and objective character of human behavior. It is true that “[v]
irtually everything that we do has a purpose to it”; Rescher is aware of this fact 
(P:  38). Nonetheless, that statement goes hand in hand with the assumption that not 
all purposes are equally good: some purposes are preferable, and are therefore to be 
pursued without hesitation. Insofar as they are objective ends that should be aimed at 
by every human being, they can be accounted for in realistic terms.
Rescher’s argument rests on the distinction between interests and needs, on the 
one side, and wants and preferences, on the other. Some of our purposes, Rescher 
writes, “are mandatory in that they relate to outright needs”; others are “merely 
relate[d] to the satisfaction of our wants” (P: 30). So, while it is mandatory for us 
to meet our needs for food and shelter, it is merely optional to meet our wants for 
amusement. Wants and desires are purely subjective, and their acceptance is a mere 
expression of preference. On the contrary, interests and needs are rational; they can 
be made the object of an assessment of preferability depending on an intersubjective 
standard of validity. It follows therefore that rationality is not just a matter of “rational 
consonance with what we believe or do or value”; it is, first and foremost, a matter of 
objective evaluation of ends (P: 33).
The breadth and import of Rescher’s realism is particularly evident here – and the 
clarity with which it is formulated brings to the fore all its problematicity. Rescher’s 
willingness to avoid any relapse into relativism or subjectivism leads him to stress the 
importance of a rational, realistic assessment of the ends of conduct. “A pragmatism 
that is consistent, coherent, and self-sustaining”, Rescher writes, “will not just 
proceed pragmatically with respect to achieving unvaluated ends and purposes, but 
must also apply its pragmatic perspective to the issue of validating ends and purposes 
themselves” (P: 36). Rationality is therefore composed of two related, yet independent 
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processes: on the one hand, the choice of means that are judged appropriate to reach a 
specific goal; on the other hand, the selection and evaluation of the ends that have to 
be pursued in the course of action. As the former process is objective, so is the latter: 
in both cases Rescher believes it possible to provide an instrumental justification 
of rationality. Ends and purposes, Rescher says, can be evaluated “in terms of their 
capacity to facilitate the realization of those conditions whose beneficial realization is, 
for us humans simply a “fact of life” (P: 36). Indeed, values are “functional objects”, 
their function being that of “helping us to lead lives that are personally satisfying...
and communally productive” (P: 36). Consequently, far from being the expression of 
subjective preferences, values are to be acknowledged as objective traits of reality. 
In the essay “The Pragmatism of Ideals” Rescher goes as far as to speak of “man’s 
unique dual citizenship in the worlds of the real and the ideal – a realm of facts and a 
realm of values” (P: 196). Thus, it is not surprising that Rescher expressly recognizes 
the existence of evaluative facts. In “Morality, Pragmatism, and the Obligations of 
Personhood”, referring to that particular type of evaluative values which are the moral 
values, he writes: “[w]e do not choose or make moral values, but learn about them by 
thinking through what it is that is required for safeguarding the best interest of people 
[...]. The capacity of certain modes of personal conduct to meet, or fail to meet, the 
requirements of morality...is clearly not a matter of ‘decision’ or ‘perspective’, but one 
of impersonal fact” (P: 187)1.
Rescher concludes his argument by saying that “[o]n this ontological perspective, 
the ultimate basis of moral duty arises from the obligation we have as rational agents 
(toward ourselves and the world at large) to make the most and best of our opportunities 
for self-development” (P: 192). And then he clarifies that “[w]hat is at issue here is a 
pragmatic approach to deontology that is geared to a teleology of value commitment 
that ultimately grounds the obligatoriness of moral injunctions in considerations of 
axiology” (P: 192). 
Rescher’s point is that “[a] pragmatism that looks to the cultivation of positive 
human goals and benefits” can set the stage for the development of a normative 
philosophical anthropology (P: 183). All these statements of allegiance to pragmatism 
notwithstanding, however, it is difficult for me to avoid the impression that there 
is something strange – something unpragmatist, one would be tempted to say – in 
Rescher’s realistic approach to axiology. In this sense, it can be said that the most 
original aspects of his thought are also the most problematic ones. To put it clearly, 
it is as if Rescher’s search for a realistic foundation of axiology led him astray from 
1. The ontology of values sketched in “Fact and Value in Pragmatic Perspective” is truly 
pragmatist in that values are not conceived as properties independent from human activity. 
In the Deweyan terminology that Rescher here adopts, values are tertiary properties that 
“represent cognitively discernible features”; they are specific aspects of reality that “only 
a suitably informed and intelligent thinker can recognize” (PV: 73). The type of realism 
that Rescher has in mind is therefore not metaphysical; it is rather a critical (in the Kantian 
sense) realism grounded on the concept of supervenience. Pragmatist supervenience is the 
idea that new and original properties arise from the transactions between human beings and 
their world.
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his original purpose of grounding pragmatist epistemology (taken at large) on the 
principle of fallibilism. 
The distinctive character of Rescher’s Peirce-inspired scientific pragmatism is the 
idea that knowledge is, in principle, always revisable. Since there is an epistemic gap 
between subjectivity and objectivity – as a consequence of which we are compelled to 
admit that “what we generally claim as knowledge is no more...than our best available 
estimate of how matters actually stand” (PV: 25) – it is logically impossible to provide 
an absolute foundation for our knowledge. Nonetheless, Rescher argues, human 
beings can attain a kind of absolute security “at the price of decreased accuracy” (P: 
97). “With any sort of estimate”, he writes, “there is always a characteristic trade-off 
relationship between the evidential security of the estimate on the one hand...and its 
contentual definiteness (exactness, detail, precision, etc.) on the other” (P: 97; see also 
PV: 27). While “[w]e estimate the height of the tree at around twenty-five feet”, “[w]e 
are quite sure that the tree is twenty-five feet, plus or minus five feet”. However, “[w]e 
are completely and absolutely sure that its height is between one inch and one hundred 
yards” (P: 97; see also PV: 27).
According to this epistemological view, pragmatic security stands in an inverse 
proportion to contentual definiteness. It is up to the knower to choose whether to 
privilege security over definiteness, or vice-versa. If he privileges security, he remains 
at the level of common sense knowledge. Common sense claims are sure because they 
are “rules of thumb, a matter of practical lore rather than scientific rigor” (PV:  28). 
The real import of the common sense claim “peaches are delicious”, Rescher says, is 
something like “most people will find the eating of suitably grown and duly matured 
peaches a relatively pleasurable experience” (PV: 28). On the contrary, if the knower 
looks for definiteness of information, he cannot rest satisfied with common sense 
knowledge. It is science that provides an explanation of natural phenomena “in terms 
of high generality and strict universality” (PV: 28). The vulnerability of scientific 
claims is a direct consequence of their search of definiteness. As Rescher writes, 
“[t]he fact that the theoretical claims of science are ‘mere estimates’ that are always 
cognitively at risk and enjoy only a modest life span has its roots in science’s inherent 
commitment to the pursuit of maximal definiteness” (PV: 28).
With all these epistemological considerations in mind, we would expect to find the 
same approach applied in the study of value. We would expect to read that the process 
of evaluation is always fallible; that every act of evaluation entails a leap in the dark; 
that even in the case of evaluation there is a gap between subjectivity and objectivity. 
Instead, when Rescher turns his attention to axiological issues, the epistemological 
landscape partially changes2. 
2. In the last paragraph of “Fact and Value in Pragmatic Perspective”, significantly entitled 
“A Crucial Analogy: The Experiential Parallelism of Description and Valuation” Rescher 
argues that descriptive facts and normative ones “share a common epistemology” (PV: 75). 
Indeed, in both cases what is at stake is the “rational systematization of experience”. Rescher 
writes: “[e]ssentially the same standard applies throughout: a judgment is valid if it belongs 
to the most cogent systematization of the whole range of our relevant, alethically fact-
oriented experience on the one side, and that of our relevant, axiologically value-oriented 
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In order to highlight this point, we will focus on Rescher’s account of morality as 
is formulated in “Morality, Pragmatism, and the Obligations of Personhood”. In this 
essay Rescher introduces a strange – from a pragmatist point of view – distinction 
between morals and mores. “Mores”, he writes, “are variable with context – they are 
matter of place and time, of social custom” (P: 182). They are conventional modes of 
behavior accepted and practiced by a particular group at a particular time. “Morals, 
by contrast, are stable and culture-invariant”, and they are “categorical and absolute”. 
So, “the person who violates morals does something actually wrong, something that 
he ought not to do” (P: 182). It is clear what Rescher wants to achieve with that 
distinction: he wants to defend the objectivity of the moral discourse against those 
attempts directed at denying its autonomy. But it is not equally clear if he is entitled to 
draw such a strong distinction between what is socially accepted and what is morally 
correct.
What is particularly problematic here is the epistemological status of “those 
universal and ‘absolute’ standards in whose terms the adequacy of any code, our own 
included, must be appraised” (P: 189). According to Rescher’s fallibilist epistemology, 
the universality and absoluteness of moral standards can be interpreted in two 
different ways. On the one hand, it can be said that moral values are universal and 
absolute in the sense that they purport to provide a universal explanation of morality. 
Taken in this sense, morals are scientific claims, whose universality is attained at the 
price of security. On the other hand, it can be said that their absoluteness stems from 
the decision to privilege security over contentual definiteness. Taken in this sense, 
morals are common sense claims which are absolutely valid because almost devoid 
of content.
I think that Rescher is not perfectly clear on this point. However, I will be inclined 
to think that he would probably embrace the second alternative because of what he says 
about the possibility of “deriving” values from facts in “Fact and Value in Pragmatic 
Perspective” (the identification of morals and values is mine). Here Rescher speaks 
of “evaluative premises that are essentially trivial and truistic”, and that are always 
unproblematically available to the agent (PV: 69). What he has in mind is something 
as follows: if you know that to act in a certain way will cause unnecessary pain (factual 
knowledge), then you can easily conclude that an action that has caused unnecessary 
pain to a person was morally wrong because you can always have recourse to the 
unproblematic premise that “it is morally wrong to hurt people’s feelings when doing 
so has no compensating positivities in other respect” (PV: 69).
If that reading is correct, Rescher’s moral theory would turn out to be grounded 
on the recognition of the relatively unproblematic character of moral life. It is as if 
he were saying that in most cases moral deliberations are a matter of unreflective 
application of moral norms. I do not think it is possible to disagree with Rescher on 
this point. It is true that we can always have recourse to unproblematic moral principle 
as the ones which he describes – “it is wrong to do something that causes people 
experience on the other” (PV: 76). However, I do not think that this important qualification 
sheds much light on the issue under consideration here, that is, the epistemological nature 
of the absolute and universal moral norms. 
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needless (pointless, unnecessary) pain” or “when a person jabs another to cause 
him pain simply and solely because he doesn’t like his looks, then this person does 
something wrong/wicked” (PV: 70-72). The problem is that of understanding if all 
our moral judgments can be traced back to this kind of unreflective and unproblematic 
evaluations. I think that such a conclusion is difficult to accept: indeed, it is difficult to 
understand how it is possible for morality to rest on a basis which is undoubtedly firm 
and secure, but which is, by definition, devoid of any content.
Part of the difficulty stems from Rescher’s ambivalent attitude towards moral 
philosophy. Rescher’s main concern when discussing moral issues is that of 
overcoming the threat of subjectivism and relativism. The need to distance himself 
from those who deny the objectivity of moral discourse leads him to overemphasize 
the aspects that support a realistic reading of our moral evaluations, to the detriment 
of those that show the personal creativity of moral life. However, there is something 
more substantial in Rescher’s insistence on the shared and undisputed objectivity of 
morality, and has to do with his conception of human nature.
As has been remarked above, Rescher’s analysis of moral discourse is part of 
a broader reflection on the nature of values. The latter is in turn dependent on a 
normative theory of human nature – what Rescher calls “a normative philosophical 
anthropology” (P: 182). Every person, Rescher writes, can choose to “become a saint 
or a sinner”; that is, it is up to him to decide whether or not to realize his potentialities. 
For this reason, it is important not simply to have “a knowledge of human nature as 
such”, but also to have a “view of the good of the mankind” (P: 182). Such knowledge 
is accessible to everybody since it concerns the most general principles of human life: 
“achieving and diffusing happiness”, “using one’s intelligence as a guide”, “enjoying 
the good things of life”, and so on (P: 183). The absoluteness and universality of moral 
values (and of values in general, if my reading is correct) derives from here, from the 
assumption that we can easily know which, among the potentialities of human life, are 
to be realized. Rescher is explicit on this point: “[i]t is all too clear that, other things 
being like equal, it is better to be healthy, to be happy, to understand what goes on, and 
the like” (P: 182). This is part of what Rescher means with “realistic epistemology”. 
It is because the “beneficial realization” of some particular conditions is “a fact of 
life” that, according to Rescher, a “pragmatically based epistemology” can be truly 
realistic (P: 36). 
In the light of what has been said, it seems possible to conclude that it is a specific 
metaphysical theory of human nature that lies at the ground of Rescher’s axiological 
thought, and that this theory somehow interferes with his epistemological views. 
Rescher seems committed to a static and immutable conception of human nature 
which is at odds with the fluxive idea of reality developed by pragmatists as well 
as with their critical and reflexive account of knowledge. After reading Rescher’s 
impressive books Pragmatism and The Pragmatic Vision one is left with the doubt 
whether a consistent pragmatist epistemology has to rest on that metaphysical account 
of human nature. 
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